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ABSTRACT 
The reconversion years after World War II were very 
important in the history of American labor. During this 
period of economic readjustment many strikes occured. 
The last of the major industrial conflicts was in the 
bituminous coal industry. This strike in 1946 finally 
led to government seizure of the mines and government 
operation continued for thirteen months. As government 
operation continued a number of conflicts arose between 
the government and the United Mine Workers. These re­
volved around the problem of the rights of and the re� 
strictions on workers in seized industries. The United 
Mine Workers tried, unsuccessfully, to maintain union 
rights, applicable in private enterprise, as government 
empl9'yeeso The result was the revival into law of the 
labor injunction and the later restrictions on union 
activities contained in the Taft-Hartley Acto 
Another development of the conflict was the handl­
ing of union demands for fringe benefits. The major 
United Mine Workers requests in 1946 and 1947 were for 
fringe benefits: mine safety regulation and funds for 
miners� welfare. It turned out that neither the govern­
ment nor the mine owners knew the ramifications, both 
v 
economic and social, of these proposals,, In both con­
tracts, in 1 9 4 6 and 1 9 4 7 ? the union received major 
concessions in these areas, and has led the way in 
the American labor movement toward achieving increased 
benefits, outside of wages and hours, for its members,, 
vi 
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CHAPTER I:: INTRODUCTION 
The years immediately after World War II were 
years of intense industrial strife in the United 
States. The country was attempting to shift pro­
duction from a war-time to a peace-time economy and 
to accomodate the demands of consumers, management, 
and labor.* 
President Truman assigned to the Office of 
Price Administration (OPA) the task of making recon­
version as peaceful as possible* It established 
price ceilings and wage floors to keep both labor 
and management in check. These measures also were 
to keep inflation to a minumum. The OPA tried 
valiantly to do this, but opposition to it made 
it very ineffective* It was opposed by labor and 
management as both wanted to be free of government 
restrictions in dealing with the other* The restric­
tions of OPA expired in July 1 9 4 6 thus removing all 
government controls except on rent. The resulting 
rise in prices forced Congress to reinstate some 
controls in late July 1946» These controls were 
too limited to slow inflation, and by mid - 1 9 4 7 all 
attempts at wage-price controls ended,, 2 
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The American consumer had built up a tremendous 
potential demand for consumer goods,, Restrictions 
on consumption during the war years had left him with 
a vast array of unfilled needs and desires. These 
restrictions had also built up reserves of money to 
purchase consumer goods. During each of the years of 
1 9 4 5 and 1 9 4 6 consumers controlled about $ 1 8 0 billion 
in cash and savings to spend in the market for con­
sumer goods as they became available,,3 Prices were 
forced up by this supply of available consumer capital. 
Despite legal outlets there were created black markets 
and prices in all markets rose. Consumer demands on 
management to produce provided a temptation to achieve 
even greater profits than during war-time. At the 
same time the obvious prosperity of business and the 
drop in real wages for labor, caused by the cut back 
in overtime and the increasing prices, forced labor 
to be ever more insistent about increases in wages 
and fringe benefits. 
Management yeilded to the consumers' demand for 
goods and to the possibilities that the situation 
presented. It used the OPA restrictions as the ex­
planation for the strikes that occurred and explained 
to the public that the work stoppages and curtailed 
production were caused by government interference 
in natural economic developments.4 The OPA price 
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ceilings encouraged the manufacturers to hold goods 
off the market or to reclassify goods into catagories 
not covered by OPA regulation,,5 It also took the 
opportunity afforded by the strikes to curry favor 
with the public in its continuing controversy with 
organized labor. Management felt if the strikes 
lasted long enough to hurt the public, management's 
image would be improved while labor's would be damaged. 
Management used a variety of methods to achieve this 
end: It refused to follow government suggestions in 
reaching settlements; it carried on a massive prop­
aganda campaign against both the unions and govern­
ment controls;6 and in some cases it refused to nego-
titate faithfully with the representatives of their 
workers as required under the Wagner Act.7 It found 
that the most effective means of gaining public 
support was to wait out the strikes* Management 
could financially and politically afford to force 
the strike issue* It could do this financially be­
cause profits had risen from 4 * 9 billion dollars in 
1 9 3 9 to an average of over 9 billion per year for the 
years 1 9 4 2 to 1 9 4 5 and exceeded 1 2 billion in 1 9 4 6 . 8 
Politically it could do this because most business­
men did not care for Harry S. Truman and his controls 
in the least. 
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Labor likewise had made substantial gains during 
the war and wished to protect and enlarge them„ By 
the time the war ended American workers had become a 
loyal, respected part of American society. Labor 
shortages, legal protection for organizing, and vig­
orous organizing campaigns had made orgaized labor 
an influential part of American life. Labor leaders 
had advanced into places of power in government and 
in public opinion.9 g ut organized labor feared that 
it could not stand a concerted attack by business. 
Truman felt there was a conspiracy by the business 
interests to destroy labor after the war.l° Organized 
labor responded to the situation as if there really 
was a conspiracy. 
Union membership had grown from 8 , 944>000 in 
1 9 4 0 to 145,749*000 in 1 9 4 5 . 1 1 This growth resulted 
in both enlarged public importance and enlarged 
strike funds that were used to consolidate labor's 
gains as soon as the war ended. During the war it 
had been following a policy of maximum cooperation 
with government and industry for the sake of the war 
effort. In the war emergency wages were fixed but 
the members of unions had enjoyed high incomes because 
of extended work weeks, overtime pay, and production 
bonuses. After the war ended it was ready and willing 
to strike to maintain these wartime gains(in both 
take-home pay and increased memberships) and to 
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achieve further advantages., Workers to protect these 
gains struck in nearly all parts of the American 
economy. The work stoppages by unions in the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were long and nearly 
stopped the entire economy. During the winter of 
1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 6 5 0 , 0 0 0 communications workers, 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 
steel workers, 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 packinghouse workers, 200 ,000 
electrical workers, and over 300 ,000 auto workers 
were on strike. 1 2 ^Altogether, 4 2 large strikes, each 
involving 1 0 , 0 0 0 or more workers, occurred between 
VJ-day and July 1 9 4 6 . " 1 3 On January 2 1 , 1 9 4 6 , there 
were 1 , 6 5 7 , 0 0 0 workers on strike.14 
The settlement of most of these strikes resulted 
in increased inflation. The pattern for these settle­
ments was first suggested by government fact-finding 
boards decisions concerning the auto and steel 
strikes.15 They called for wage hikes of about l 8 - | 
cents per hour and price increases to keep profits 
at, what the government considered, a reasonable 
level o 1 ^ In the steel industry this price increase 
amounted to five dollars a ton. The settlement by 
wage increases and compensating price increases became 
a formula for settlements in the automobile, electric­
al, petroleum and most other industries.*7 
By late February peace was coming to the America 
economy. Only in the bituminous coal industry were 
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6 
extensive problems arising,, The probable serious 
disruption of a coal strike on April 1 , when the 
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1 9 4 5 would 
expire, was the last major basic industry labor dis­
pute of reconversion. 
The coal industry was the most unionized American 
industry and the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) 
was one of the nation8s strongest labor unions. The 
UMWA, under the autocratic control of John L. Lewis,^ 
had just rejoined the American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
on January 2 5 , 1 9 4 & , in an attempt to unify the Amer­
ican labor movement.*9 The UMWA had been expelled 
from the AFL when it differed with the AFL leadership 
over industrial unionism that resulted in the organ­
ization of the CIO ten years earlier. John L. Lewis 
resigned the presidency of the CIO in 1 9 4 0 and had 
taken the UMWA out of the CIO in 1 9 4 2 . During the 
war and immediately thereafter the CIO was very 
agressive in working for its members. It was because 
of this militancy, with which Lewis did not wish to 
be associated, and because the CIO had a number of 
Communists in its national organization that the 
politically conservative Lewis reafilliated with 
the AFL, again joining a craft organized group rather 
than the industrially organized group he had helped 
establish. The UMWA had been an independent union 
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politically conservative Lewis reafilliated ith 
the AFL, again joining a craft organized group rather 
than the industrially organized group he had helped 
establish.. The UMWA had been an independent union 
7 
from 1 9 4 2 to 1 9 4 6 . 2 0 John L. Lewis was named 
thirteenth vice-president of the AFL and was appoint­
ed to the executive council of the AFL upon his re­
turn to the House of Labor, as the AFL has been 
known. 
On March 2 , 1 9 4 6 , UMWA notified the bituminous 
coal operators that the union was requesting a meeting 
on March 1 2 to write a new contract. The contract 
between the UMWA and the operators under which the 
mines operated would expire on April 1 , as it did 
every year. As required by the War Labor Disputes 
Act of 1943(Smith-Connally Act) the government was 
also notified by the UMWA that a labor dispute existed 
and that a strike was probable after April 1 if no 
91 
contract could be signed by this date. 1 The UMWA 
Policy Committee, meeting March 1 1 in Washington, D.C., 
formulated the strategy to be used and demands that 
would be presented to the operators. 2 2 
Union strategy was a throwback to the famous 
"Jacksonville Agreement" of 1 9 2 6 . This was to present 
very general demands thus placing the burden of begin­
ning the negotiations upon the operators. The union 
demands were general and non-specific. The coal 
miners, because they were the highest paid industrial 
workers and therefore had little to fear in the area 
of wage reductions per se, placed their primary 
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contract could be signed by this date. 2  The UMWA 
Policy Committee, meeting March 11 in washington, D.C., 
formulated the strategy to be used and demands that 
would be presented to the operators,,22 
Union strategy was a throwback to the famous 
"Jacksonville Agreement lt of 1926 0 This was to present 
very general demands thus placing the burden of begin-
ning the negotiations upon the operatorso The union 
demands were general and non-specific.. The coal 
miners, because they were the highest paid'industrial 
workers and therefore had little to fear in the area 
of wage reductions per se, placed their primary 
 
emphasis on fringe benefits and union security. 
The main union demand was for a health and welfare 
fund that would be operated by the union. They also 
asked for unionization of supervisory, technical and 
clerical employees; increased wages; reduced daily 
and weekly working hours; and a stronger safety 
code. They did not, however, set any specific 
amounts on any of these areas. These were, the 
union insisted, not demands but only "negotiable 
suggestions. ! , 2 3 
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CHAPTER II: NEGOTIATION* STRIKE, AND SEIZURE 
Contract negotiations began on March 12 at the 
Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D,C. John L. Lewis, 
John O'Leary, union vice-president, and Thomas 
Kennedy, UMWA secretary-treasurer, participated in 
the negotiations for the miners. The operators were 
represented by Charles OflNeill, operators1 negotia­
tion committee chairman and representative.of the 
Northern operators; Harry M. Moses, representing 
U. So Steel and the captive mine operators; and 
Edward R. Burke, ex-Senator from Nebraska and the 
negotiating agent for and president of the Southern 
operators association.* 
The first week was devoted to union presenta­
tion of its demands0 Lewis opened the meetings 
with a condemnation of the operators in the area of 
miners1 protection and welfare. In support of his 
argument Lewis had the thirty-one district presidents 
of the union present testimony of conditions in each 
district. The union made only two specific demands: 
first, it said that there must be abatement of the 
slaughter of miners and, second, it demanded cessa­
tion of the accompanying extortion of the miners by 
the company doctor system.2 This tactic of talking 
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only of protection for the miners completely caught 
the operators off-guard. 
The operators, in press releases, charged Lewis 
with filibustering and stalling .3 They demanded that 
Lewis discuss a wage agreement that would assure the 
nation of its fuel supply, and refused to discuss 
welfare, which they considered outside their juris­
diction to negotiated Lewis refused to talk of wages 
and simply asked the operators to offer something 
specific on the need for health improvements. Lewis 
restated that the primary demands of the miners were 
for improved working conditions and a welfare fund 
and that these^must come before he was willing to 
discuss wages. "It is my opinion," Lewis told the 
operators, "that the miners don't want to work for you 
gentlemen any more unless you remedy the conditions."5 
After the week of union oratory the conference 
settled down to hear similar oratory from the oper­
ators. The operators in a lengthy presentation offer­
ed their counter-demands. These consisted of a strong­
er guarantee from the union against wildcat strikes, 
new restrictive qualifications for vacation pay, and 
loss of the paid lunch preiod. Concessions to the 
miners included a wage increase of 18% cents per hour, 
voluntary compliance with state workmen8s compensation 
and mine safety laws, and a 40 hour week.^ They would 
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not discuss the welfare fund proposal or the other 
major union demand, the unionization of foremen, since, 
as they saw it, the meeting was to negotiate a wage 
contract.? 
Lewis refused to consider or respond to the 
operators8 proposals on wages and hours until the 
operators agreed to the idea of a welfare fund. In 
a public statement he proposed a Gallup poll to dis­
cover if the American public condoned the killing in 
Q 
the mines. 0 On March 20 , after a session further 
outlining their proposals, the operators1 represent­
atives publicly stated that a strike was inevitable 
and by saying this they condemned the negotiations 
to failure.9 
When no agreement was reached on March 2 6 , Lewis 
sent a notice to the local unions stating: "No agree­
ment will be in existence after the above date /April 1 
1 9 4 6 / 9 until present negotiations are completed. 
Each member will be governed accordingly." This was 
the union's strike call. It is a rule with miners 
that they do not work without a contract.1 0 The 
threat of government seizure did not influence union 
policy, since the previous seizures, in 1 9 4 3 a n d 
1 9 4 5 * had given the UMWA a generous contract with 
the government. 
The main point of difference between the nego­
tiators for the mine operators and the mine workers 
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When no agreement was reached on March 26, Lewis 
sent a notice to the local unions stating: "No agree-
ment will be in existence after the above date LApril 1, 
I 94§7, until present negotiations are completed. 
Each member will be governed accordingly. t! This was 
the union~s strike call. It is a rule with miners 
that they do not work without a contract. 10 The 
threat of government seizure did not influence union 
policy, since the previous seizures, in 1943 and 
1945, had given the UMWA a generous contract with 
the government. 
The main point of difference between the nego-
tiators for the mine operators and the mine workers 
was the welfare fund* A miners8 welfare fund was 
first proposed by the union in the 1 9 4 5 negotiations 
but was dropped because the union felt it would not 
be politically expedient to call a strike during the 
war0 The 1 9 4 5 proposal had first introduced the 
union suggestion of a ten cent per ton royalty as a 
means to finance the fund. 1 1 The operators had ex­
pected this demand to be included in the 1 9 4 6 meeting 
and planned to counter with one financed through a 
wage deduction. 1 2 They did not, however, expect 
Lewis to ignore wages and hours and to base the whole 
prospective agreement on this issue. 
Thomas Kennedy, with Lewis8 approval, let it be 
known in an unofficial statement that the union pre-
fered the ten cent royalty to a wage percentage as 
had been proposed. This was to give their position 
further support.*3 The operators, in a press state­
ment to counter the union, said they already paid 
nearly ten cents per ton in Social Security and state 
welfare taxes.14 Lewis, in a reply that attempted to 
divide and confuse the operators, said that if there 
was not to be a fund, then wage increases must be 
more than substantially increased.15 
The operators, wishing to transfer the contro­
versy to areas where the miners had less support, and 
to avert a strike over the welfare fund issue, said 
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they were willing to have a study made on the health 
and welfare of miners by an impartial commission.^ 
They wanted it understood that "any resultant wel­
fare programme should be administered by some inde­
pendent agency, such as the American Red Cross.'1*? 
The union would not consider this proposal as they 
wanted complete control of the fund. When there was 
no agreement on any of the basic issues, the mines 
closed on April 1 . 
When the strike began the country had about one 
month's supply of coal, but it was so distributed 
that in some places not nore than a week's supply of 
1 ft 
coal was available. The union assured the nation 
when the strike was called that coal would be pro­
duced to prevent extreme hardship, but thes assurances 
were meaningless except for only a few communities. 
Heat and power for whole communities in some areas 
was maintained and in a few others coal was mined to 
keep schools and hospitals in operation. This was 
not a widespread procedure, however, occuring most 
often in localities closely tied to coal mining.19 
Negotiations resumed after the strike call in 
the same mood as before: the union talking of welfare 
and the operators talking of wages. Lewis interrupted 
this pattern by asking for back payment for holidays 
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worked during the war.^ u The government began to 
take an active role in the negotiations with the 
appointment, by Secretary of Labor Lewis Schwellenbach, 
of Paul Fuller as mediator on April l.2* When these 
talks reached no agreements by April 1 0 , Lewis 
walked out. The operators, who continued to meet 
with Fuller, gave up and went home on April l8. At 
this time the operators began a massive propaganda 
campaign to discredit the proposed welfare fund. 2 2 
While negotiations were broken off Lewis spoke 
at the UMWA Tri-District Anthracite Convention in 
Hazelton, Pennsylvania. Here he blamed the stoppage 
on the U.S. Steel Corporation. He based this on an 
offer from Moses asking that the captive mines be 
allowed to work on a retroactive policy. 2 3 This was 
to Lewis virtual acceptance of the welfare fund. 
Lewis refused Moses8 offer because he was trying to 
get the Southern operators, the main opponents of the 
welfare fund, to break from the conference. A division 
in the conference would probably assure a welfare fund 
in a contract with the more agreeable Northern and 
captive operators. 
Schwellenbach insisted the meetings be resumed 
and a new series of meetings were begun on April 30» 
These lasted only a few days. As before neither side 
would talk on what the other side wanted discussed, 
or e  r  a ,,20 ent  
t oti t  it  
i ent,  cr t  r i ell ,
l ll r ediat r pril 10 1 he
 ent  pril i
al  o erat r t  eet
it  ull r  ent pril 1  t
im er t r  assi  o
pai  i r it s  elf r fund. 2
hil  oti t  er  f i
t  ri istri t nthr i ~e onventi  
azelt , nsyl ani . er a  top
.  t l orporat "  
 ro  oses  t t i
low  or  t  l cy.2  i
i i l t  elf r u  
i  os B f   a  
t ut r  erat r ai  nent  
elf r  ,  ro  "  io
f  oul  l  elf r  
tr t it  or l  ort r  
t  r so 
ell   eeti  esu  
 eeti er   pril .
es  l  e o i r 
oul  hat t r ant  sc
16 
thus no meaningful negotiations oceured at these 
meetings. 
After a month's loss of coal, in a strike that 
UMWA secretary-treasurer Kennedy called "the most 
airtight ever," coal stockpiles were extremely low.^4 
Only 200 of America's 4200 coal mines were still pro­
ducing. The producing mines were scattered small 
non-union mines and the southern Illinois fields 
under contract with the Progressive Mine Workers. 2 5 
On May 4 President Truman called the dispute a 
"national disaster."2^ He ordered a rationing program 
to conserve coal. Railroads cut freight shipments to 
the essentials and reduced passenger service 50 per­
cent. The nation's public utilities reduced output 
and created a "brown-out" over much of the East.27 
Government seizure was still not anticipated either 
by the President or the press, despite the slowing of 
the economy because of lack of c o a l . ^ 
When the negotiations that had begun on April 30 
produced, no agreement. President Truman asked Lewis 
and O'Neill to meet him on May 1 0 at 2 : 0 0 p.m. at the 
White House. Lewis, in his biggest coup of the dis­
pute, notified reporters at 1 : 0 0 p.m. that he had 
called a two-week truce during which the miners would 
return to work on the condition that any benefits 
later received would be retroactive to May 1 0 . As 
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Lewis put it, "This action is the contribution of the 
United Mine Workers of America to our nation's economy, 
which is being imperiled by the stupidity and selfish 
greed of the coal operators. r , 2 9 ^ the meeting, 
Truman told the disputants that they must reach an 
agreement by May 1 5 . O'Neill, bowing to Presidential 
influence, agreed to the welfare fund "in principle."3° 
Although approved by the union, the operators' 
negotiating committee repudiated O'Neill in stating 
that they would not accept any welfare fund. The union 
replied, on May 1 5 , that maybe a seven percent levy 
on total payroll would be acceptable for financing the 
fund rather than the tern cent per ton royalty. This 
was also refused by the operators who would not now 
even consider any welfare fund. When an arbitration 
proposal of President Truman was rejected by both 
parties on May 1 7 , the federal mediators, Fuller and 
newly appointed Edward McGrady(former assistant Secre­
tary of Labor), noting the futility of the talks, 
suggested a suspension of negotiations.31 Most 
Washington observers then expected seizure rather 
soon . 3 2 The mines were seized four days later. 
As the coal dispute reached the crisis point it 
was a railroad stoppage not the coal strike that 
brought the first strong anti-labor action by Presi­
dent Truman. The railroads, already running on a 
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Truman in a nationwide radio address on May 24 
38 
partial schedule because of the coal shortages,33 had 
received a strike notice on April 1 8 . 3 4 ^s the rail­
road strike date approached, May l 8 , an arbitration 
board decision of a $ 1 . 2 8 . a day wagel increase^ and a 
deferment on changes in work rules was accepted by 
the carriers. Eighteen of the twenty railway brother­
hoods agreed to this settlement, but not the Locomotive 
Engineers and the Railroad Trainmen.35 
On May 1 5 President Truman interceded telling 
A. F. Whitney of the Trainmen and Alvany Johnston of 
the Engineers to sign the contract by May 1 7 , or he 
would seize the railroads. No agreement was reached 
and Truman seized the railroads on May 1 7 , one day 
before the threatened strike. Immediately the Presi­
dent asked for and got a five day postponement of the 
strike from the unsatisfied brotherhoods.36 Clark 
Clifford, government negotiator, meeting continously 
with Johnston and Whitney tried to arrange a settle­
ment. The representatives of the Trainmen and the 
Engineers were willing to accept the wage increase as 
accepted by the carriers, but were not willing to wait 
for changes in work rules that they considered 
essential.37 The strike began on May 2 3 . The govern­
ment, throught the Office of Defense Transportation, 
immediately ordered the Army to operate the trains. 
rti l l   l 3   
 k t pril 0  As i -
 k t , a 1 , io
r   i  i   0 2Et _ . \Vatge':' uc·.r a;. 8Iil
ent or  a t  
r i t  t  lw  t r-
 tlem t, t t oti
gi eer   ail  ainm . 3  
a r i t erce  lin
. e hit  r n   l  st  
ngi eer Si  tr t a ,
oul  lroa  ent a  
   lro a ,
r  ik o ediatel  r Si-
t   t v  p ent 
k ro  sati f  s. 6 l
li , ent oti t r, eeti  t l
it  s   hit  ie  a t -
ent. t t  r n   
gi eer er ill  t a
t  r t er t ill  ait
or t  
t o  ik  a 0 r -
ent, t ffi ef s  r s ort t
i ediatel    r   er t   t.r i e 3  
ion i  r  a
placed the complete blame for the stoppage on Whitney 
and Johnston. Truman, on May 2 5 , asked Congress for 
temporary power that would allow him to draft into 
the Army any workers striking in a seized industry. 
The Trainmen and Engineers signed the same contract 
as had the other eighteen brotherhoods while Truman 
was speaking.39 The railroads, now that an agreement 
had been reached, were returned to their owners on 
May 2 6 . 
This action by Truman was violently denounced 
by labor, since Truman had been considered friendly 
to labor before. Whitney pledged the Trainmen's 
entire treasury of $47 million to defeat Truman in 
1 9 4 8 . 4 0 The United Mine Workers Journal said the 
draft labor proposal was the result of public hys­
teria. 4 * The miners, now that they worked in a 
seized industry feared the labor draft may be used 
against them. The draft labor idea, though stopped 
in the Senate by, of all people, Robert Taft, did 
settle the railroad strike and pushed the miners to 
a quick settlement of their strike. Truman, in his 
first definite anti-labor move, made it clear to 
everyone the length he would go to prevent any 
drastic disruption of the economy. 
The railroad strike had another effect on the 
coal situation: it destroyed the truce. When the 
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railroad strike stopped transportation, coal mines 
working during the truce were forced to shut down 
because of a lack of coal cars. But as the trains 
began moving again the miners continued to stay away 
from the mines. As the truce was breaking down so 
were negotiations on a coal settlement. This was 
partially because the operators expected seizure when 
the railroads were seized on May l 8 „ 4 2 The breakdown 
of the truce is seen in Pennsylvania where of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 
miners only 2 5 , 0 0 0 were working on May 1 9 , forcing 
U. S. Steel at Pittsburgh to operate at 1 2 percent 
capacity, and steel production later fell to seven 
percent .43 Another reason for the slackening of 
negotiations was the propaganda campaign against 
welfare funds, that was resulting in a movement in 
Congress, led by Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, to 
outlaw union run welfare funds.44 Government seizure 
of the mines on May 21 did not solve the problem 
because there was.no assurance that.the miners would 
work under government supervision. In 1 9 4 3 when 
Roosevelt seized the mines the miners would not work 
without a contract between their union and the govern­
ment. It was, therefore, necessary for a government-
UMWA contract. 
The seizure order directed Secretary of the 
Interior Julius Krug, as Solid Fuels Administrator, 
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to sign an agreement with the UMWA. After extended 
meetings, with both the union and the operators, Krug 
was unable to reach an agreement by the end of the 
truce, when the few miners still working again refused 
to work without a contract.45 The government asked, 
in vain, that the miners keep working. The mines 
worked by the Progressive Mine Workers, deized in the 
general seizure of May 21 , were returned to their 
owners on May 26 since they were under a working con­
tract. 46 A settlement of the strike was assured when 
Krug and Lewis agreed on the general outlines of a 
contract on May 27. By this time only 227 of 4109 
seized mines were working.47 The strike was ended on 
May 29 with the signing, with Truman's approval, of 
the Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1946, known as 
the Krug-Lewis agreement.4^ The necessary approvals, 
by the Wage Stabilization Board and the OPA, came 
almost immediately. Part of the OPA's approval was 
a price increase of 40g cents per ton that the oper­
ators needed to help cover the increased production 
costs.49 
Most periodicals and newspapers considered the 
agreement a "Lewis Victory.w The United Mine Workers 
Journal was very happy to get the safety features and 
especially the welfare fund. The operators were, as 
the operators8 journal Coal Age said, "deeply dismayed 
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over the contract," and the Washington Post demanded 
that the government he restricted in signing future 
contracts with unions in seized industries.5° ^ Gallup 
poll on June 1 showed that only 1 3 percent of those 
polled had a favorable opinion of Lewis.51 Most 
people felt as did David E, Lilienthal, head of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, that finally the coal strike 
was settled and that now production could get going 
again.52 others hoped or feared that this was the 
first step in nationalization of the coal industry.53 
As is usually the case, the settlement in the bitu­
minous industry set the pattern for the anthracite 
contract that was signed on June 7» 
The strike had a strong impact on the American 
economy. The stoppage, excluding the two week truce, 
lasted 4 5 days. Coal supplies in most communities 
neared exhaustion by May 1 . "Brown-outs" were in 
effect over much of the East and Midwest. Heavy 
industry, including automobiles, dependent upon steel, 
was hard hit when steel production declined to less 
than ten percent of capacity. Railroads ran only on 
very restricted schedules. Freight shipments were 
limited to food, fuel, and other essentials; passenger 
service was reduced to only 25 percent of previous 
schedules. 
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Another major result was that coal starved 
Europe, dependent on exported American coal, barely 
maintained itselfo The Colliery Guardian, voice of 
the British coal industry, warned that the Civilian 
Production Administration "declared that no alloca­
tions of coal to Europe can be entertained for the 
current month/April 1 9 4 ^7 * F o r some time America has 
been unable to contribute a full quota*"54 j n a n 
attempt to help alleviate the problem ex-New York 
mayor LaGuardia, in charge of European relief, pleaded 
with the disputants for 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons of coal needed 
for immediate shipment.55 
Government operation of the mines was placed in 
the care of Secretary of the Interior Krug as Solid 
Fuels Administrator and Coal Mines Admistrator. 
Krug named Vice Admiral(later Admiral) Ben Moreell 
to direct coal production, but actual operation of 
the mines was placed in the hands of the owner. The 
mines were to be returned to the operators when they 
signed a contract with the UMWA incorporating the 
provisions of the Krug-Lewis agreement. Few operators 
availed themselves of this provision and many predic­
tions of a quick return of the mines to their owners 
were dampened when most of the operators said they 
would not sign any contract until the safety and fore­
men issues were settled to their satisfaction. 56 
not er aj r lt a t l arv
r , ent rt  eric  l
aint i  s o li  uardi , i
rit  l st , ar  t i i
r ct  dministrati  l  t lo -
io l r t  
r t ont LApril £ 0 For some time America has 
 l   tr t   l  tao tl  In an 
tte t t  l   t  le  -N  r  
ayor uardia, i  r  f r  li , leaded. 
it  t e is t ts f r ,  t s f c al needed 
f r i ediate shipment. 5
over ent er t  i a . aced. 
cr t  t  r li  
el dministrat r  oal ine dmistrat r  
r i dmiral(later dmiral oreell
i t l cti , t t l er t  
i a  ner 0 
i er  er t r h
g  tr ct it  A r t  
i  r - i e o r t
ail  sel  i   a i -
io i   i i ner
er pe e  h ost er t r  
oul  t   tr t til   -
e er t  i o 5  
The government reluctantly57 settled down to 
producing coal. Provisions of the Krug-Lewis agree­
ment were put into action: the writing of a new safety 
code was started going into effect on July 29 ; 
5 8 
on 
June 4 the medical survey under the direction of Rear 
Admiral Joel T. Boone was started checking coal town 
conditions;59
 a n d money began to come into the funds 
set up in the contract0 More than three million 
dollars had been received by August 1 by the paymaster 
of the Navy(overseer of the collection), but no 
trustees for the Welfare and Retirement fund had 
been appointed. The Southern operators refused to 
pay the required royalty in a losing attempt to get 
the funds declared illegal in court.6°
 C o a l produc­
tion climbed to 1 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons per week in the 3000 
seized mines. This was approaching a record for 
summer production.^1 The miners, for the most part 
working six days a week, began repaying company stores 
the $35 million in credit that had been advanced 
during the strike.^2 
On September 1 0 , at government insistence, the 
operators and the UMWA renewed talks for the first 
time since seizure.^ The union position was that it 
had a good contract with the government and, therefore, 
could merely wait for a better offer from the opera­
tors. These talks accomplished little since the 
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June 4 the medical survey under the direction of Rear 
Admiral Joel T. Boone. was started checking coal town 
concU tions; 59 and money began to com  into the funds
set up i  the contracto More than three million 
dollars had been received by August 1 by the paymaster 
of the Navy(overse r of the collection), but no 
trust es for the Welfare and Retireme t fund had 
been appointed~ The Southern operators refused to 
pay the required royalty in a losing attempt to get 
the funds declared illegal in c urt. 60 Coal produc-
ion climbed to 12,000,000 tons per week in the 3000 
seized mines. This was appr aching a record for 
ummer production,,61 The miners, for the most part 
working six days a week, began repaying co pany stores 
the $35 million in cr dit th t had been advanced 
during the strikeo 62 
On S ptember 10, at government inSistence, the 
operators and the UMWA renew d talks for he first 
time since seizurea 63 The union position was that it 
had a good contract with the g vernment and, therefore, 
could merely wait for a better offer from the opera-
t rso These t lks accomplished little since the 
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operators were still divided over the acceptance of 
the welfare funds and the unionization of foremen. 
The Northern operators and the captive mine owners 
were willing to accept these provisions just to get 
their mines hack, but not unless the Southern owners 
also accepted. The Southern operators would not 
consider accepting either idea. In the midst of these 
meetings Admiral Moreell retired at the end of Sep-
tember(the government kept the mines under Navy 
administration by appointing his deputy, Captain 
N. H. Collisson, as Coal Mines Administrator).^ 
Talks between the operators and the union were 
recessed while the miners held their convention be­
ginning October 1 in Atlantic City. Twenty-eight 
hundred miners, meeting without their leader, who 
was downed with an emergency appendectomy in Wash­
ington, passed resolutions praising Lewis1 leader­
ship, giving Lewis full backing on future negotia-
tions(with one exceptions any future contract must 
be national in coverage), and denouncing government 
operation as "fake and delusion0r 8 
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CHAPTER III: BREAK IN SWA-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
The fall of 1 9 4 6 saw renewed conflict between 
the UMWA and the government,, It revolved around in­
terpretation of the Krug-Lewis agreement and, later, 
the revival of the use of the injunction in labor 
disputes. As with the earlier railroad strike, 
President Truman used his prestige and power to 
break a strike. 
The dispute arose on October 1 4 when Lewis 
accused the government of breaking the Krug-Lewis 
agreement through unilateral interpretation. He 
stated that Krug8s misinterpretations of the vaca­
tion clause and the method of computing welfare fund 
payments were direct violations of the contract. He 
asked for a meeting on November 1 to reopen the con­
tract for inclusion of; proposed changes. 1 His de­
mand for new negotiations was based on part 1 of the 
Krug-Lewis agreement that carried forward those 
parts of the 1 9 4 5 agreement no amended or supple­
mented. This, Lewis argued, included Section 1 5 
of the 1 9 4 5 agreement that states in part: "at any 
time after March 1 , 1 9 4 6 , either party may give ten 
day's notice in writing of a desire for a negotiating 
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conference upon matters outlined in said notice. The 
other party agrees to attend said conference.t l 2 
Krug, on a western inspection (campaign) tour, 
received the notice in Amarillo, Texas. He wired 
Lewis that the Krug-Lewis agreement runs for the term 
of government operation and cannot be reopened. He 
said that he would, however, be willing to meet Lewis 
anytime after November 5 , election day. At the same 
time in Washington, Captain Collisson rejected any 
idea of reopening the contract. Collisson said that 
all interpretations of policy under the Krug-Lewis 
agreement had been agreed to by all interested parties. 
He agreed the union's interpretation of pro-rata va­
cation pay was correct and ordered that the decision 
of an Illinois umpire on the question, favorable to 
the UMWA, be adoped as government policy. This de­
cision on vacation pay was immediately challenged, 
unsuccessfully, by the operators because they felt 
the umpire that made the decision was partial.3 
Krug notified Lewis that the only way to meet 
on November 1 was for Lewis to come to Tule Lake, 
California, where Krug would be on November 1. 
Lewis rejected this saying that according to the 
contract all meetings must be held in Washington. 
He sent Krug the following telegram on October 22: 
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"Failure on your part to honor this meeting will 
constitute another breach of the contract and will 
void the Krug-Lewis agreement."4 The real threat 
of a strike on November 1 9 before the election, now 
faced the Administration. 
President Truman now faced an unpleasant 
decision: He could back Krug letting a strike 
occur five days before the election or he could 
back down from Lewis when one of the Republicans 
main arguments against the Democrats was that the 
Democrats were appeasing labor. Truman ordered 
Krug to find a solution before the election.5 At 
the same time he asked Attorney General Clark for 
an opinion on the legality of Lewis" demands.. On 
October 29 Clark reported to Truman that he felt 
Lewis had the legal right to reopen the contract 
Krug9 in the mean time under direct orders 
from Truman to somehow avert the strike, realized 
his mistake of not meeting Lewis. He notified Lewis 
that, although it was impossible for him to be back 
in Washington by November 1, his deputy Captain 
Collisson would meet with the UMWA. Lewis replied 
in a telegram to Krug that "under these conditions 
Krug-Lewis agreement remains effective and un­
changed during period of negotiations."7 The 
Administration had stopped a pre-election strike, 
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but its ambivalance to and seemingly capitulation 
before Lewis did not help the Democrats in the 
election. The Republicans won control of the House 
of Representatives by a 246 to 189 division and the 
Senate by 51 to 45 . 
The meeting on November 1 between Captain 
Collisson and UMWA vice-president O'Leary deadlock­
ed on what the meeting represented. The union con­
tended that the holding of the meeting was an admis­
sion by the government in support of Lewis' inter­
pretation of the Krug-Lewis agreement. Collisson 
insisted that the meeting was only to discuss prob­
lems not to negotiate changes in the existing con-
Q 
terct. Other meetings with Collisson were held 
on November 4 , 6, and 7 . The union, insisting on 
negotiation9 asked for a reduction of the standard 
work week from 54 to 4° hours with no loss in pay. 
The government responded that it could not change 
these conditions because this would require re­
opening the contract. 
Krug and Lewis finally met on November 1 1 , 
at which time the union presented its proposed con­
tract changes directly to the Coal Mines Adminis­
trator. At a second meeting on November 13 , Krug 
asked that the union begin negotiations with the 
operators and that the union postpone any strike for 
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terct. S Other meetings with Oollisson were held' 
on November 4, 6, and 70 The union, insisting on 
negotiation, asked for a reduction of the standard 
work week from 54 to 40 hours with no loss in pay. 
The government responded that it could not change 
these: conditions because this would require re-
opening the contract o 
Krug and Lewis finally met on November 11, 
at which time the union presented its proposed con-
tract changes directly to the Coal Mines Adminis-
tratoro At a second meeting on November 13, Krug 
asked that the union begin negotiations with the 
operators and that the union postpone any strike for 
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60 days after which time the government would return 
the mines to their owners even if no contract was 
reached, Lewis replied that the UMWA did not have 
a contract with the operators and that he wished 
changes in the contract it did have with the govern­
ment, rather than negotiate a new contract with the 
operators.9 
The UMWA, on November 1 5 , exercising what 1 it 
considered its right under the 1945 contract, 
terminated the Krug-Lewis agreement on November 20, 
On the same day, November 1 5 , the President, with 
Cabinet support, decided that it would not yield to 
Lewis, Truman did this for two reasons: he blamed 
the election results on Lewis and he feared any 
support of Lewis would mean continued government 
operation of the mines0 Truman would, if necessary 
to prevent the walkout, invoke the provisions out­
lawing strikes against the government,!0 The 
government, though it had the law behind it, did 
not have the miners8 support, and thus froze coal 
supplies for essential use only, expecting the 
worst, Krug announced the mines would remain in 
operation and asked the miners to stay at work. The 
Attorney General, reversing himself, decided that 
the UMWA could not legally end the Krug-Lewis 
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agreement, and on November 1 8 secured a temporary 
injunction, from Judge To Alan Goldsborough of the 
District Court of Washington, restraining Lewis from 
ending the contract for at least nine days and re­
stricting the UMWA from publicising its position.1 1 
Despite the injunction the miners did not work on 
November 2 1 . 
Since the UMWA does not, in its frame of refer­
ence, call strikes the injunction had no force. The 
injunction had ordered Lewis to withdraw the notice 
that the Krug-Lewis agreement was no longer in force. 
Lewis maintained that this was not a strike call 
only information.for the miners. AFL president 
William Green supported the UMWA philosophy when he 
stated, "The miners have individually discontinued 
work on their own initiative, and without orders 
from any source whatsoever.1 , 1 2 The miners had again 
struck following their "no contract, no work" dictum 
upon notice from John L. Lewis that there was no 
contract. 
On November 2 1 , upon petition from Attorney 
General Clark, Judge Goldsborough ordered Lewis and 
the UMWA to show cause, on November 2 5 , why they 
whould not be punished for contempt of court. 
November 25 passed with Lewis still defying the 
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order. His contempt trial was set for November 27 
and continued for three days . *3 
At the trial, the union, represented by AFL 
counsel Joseph A..Padaway and UMWA chief counsel 
Welly K. Hopkins, based its defense on the idea 
that the court order was invalid because it was a 
violation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1 9 3 2 that 
forbids any court the power to issue any injunction 
in a labor dispute.14 The UMWA contended that the 
injunction was illegal then failure to obey the 
injunction could not be considered as contempt. 
The government said that the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
did not apply to the government as employer nor 
could it be construed to prohibit injunctions to 
protect the public welfare.*5 on November 29 Judge 
Goldsborough ruled against a union motion to dismiss 
the case and denyed the union's grounds for ignoring 
the order. On the same day the government got a ten 
1 fi 
day extension of the injunction. 
Meanwhile the strike continued. As during the 
spring strike there were no pickets nor any dis­
turbances. The union, as usual, allowed maintain-
ence men and clerical workers to remain on the job 
to facilitate the return to work and to keep the 
workings in a save condition. Many miners 
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Meanwhile the strike continued" As during the 
spring strike there were no pickets nor any dis-
turbances~ The union 9 as usual, allowed maintain-
ence men and clerical workers to remain on the ·job 
to facilitate the return to work and to keep the 
workings in a save condition~ Many miners 
appreciated, the work break since, in most mining 
areas, the hunting season was in effect. 
While the UMWA and the government were in court, 
Edward Burke, president of the Southern Coal Pro­
ducers8 Association, proposed a resumption of 
negotiations between the UMWA and the operators. 
The other members of the association, hoping that 
the government would weaken the union9 were in no 
mood to negotiate. The Association directors 
stated: "When operation of the mines is resumed, 
then the question of an orderly negotiation of a 
collective bargaining agreement will become an 
appropriate one."1 But not while the government 
is fighting the operators8 battle with the UMWA. 
Burke was forced to resign his position on Decem­
ber 4* 
On December 3 Judge Goldsborough ruled that the 
UMWA and Lewis were guilty of contempt. In an 
unusual step he asked the counsel of both sides for 
a meeting to determine the sentence. The following 
day the UMWA was fined $3^500^,000, which represented 
$250f000 per day for the 14 days the union refused 
to comply with the court order. Lewis was fined 
$10,00 personally for civil and criminal contempt. 
The injunction was extended indefinitely. In the 
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decision the judge said that Lewis "willfully, 
wrongly, and deliberately permitted" the strike 
to continue that "caused and will continue to cause 
irreparable injury to the plaintiff, to the people 
of the United States and to the industry and econ­
omy of the United States."*9 
UMWA attorneys filed an appeal and posted the 
required bonds on December 6 . Both union and gov­
ernment attorneys sought immediate Supreme Court 
consideration by filing a writ of certiorari to 
bypass the Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 0 
In a statement on December 7 Lewis ended the 
17 day walkout. The miners would return to work 
under the conditions of the Krug-Lewis agreement 
until March 3 1 , 1947- He sent the miners back to 
work so that the Supreme Court "during its period 
of deliberation . . . be free from public pressure 
superinduced by the hysteria and frenzy of an 
exonomic crisis. In addition, public necessity 
requires the quantitative production of coal." He 
also stated the willingness of the UMWA "to nego­
tiate a new wage agreement for the bituminous 
industry with such parties as may demonstrate their 
authority to do so, whether it be an alphabetical 
agency of the United States Government or the 
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associated coal operators." 1 But neither would 
demonstrate its desire to negotiate, as the govern­
ment was waiting for the Supreme Court decision and 
the operators, knowing the Supreme Court decision 
was a while off, hoped the new Congress would pass 
some type of law restricting unions. 
The Supreme Court accepted the case and set the 
hearing of arguments on the contempt proceedings for 
January 14 , 1947• The union based its arguments in 
three areas: first, the District Court had no power 
to issue the injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act and the Clayton Act; second, the rights of the 
union under the first, eighth, and thirteenth amend­
ments were violated because the union could not pub­
licize its position, it did not have a jury trial 
as required in criminal contempt charges, and the 
injunction made coal mining involuntary servitude; 
and lastly, even if the injunction was valid the 
fines were excessive, thus cruel and unusual pun­
ishment. 2 2 
The Supreme Court considered the case of the 
United States vs. United Mine Workers of America so 
important that it broke tradition in handing down a 
mid-week decision(the first since 1932) . On 
March 6 the Supreme Court, in a split decision, 
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ruled against the union on all points except that 
the fine against the UMWA was excessive. The 
Court decided: 
1. That the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not 
intended to apply to the United States as 
an employer. The court divided 5 to 4 on 
this question, with Justices Rutledge and 
Frankfurter dissenting. 
2 . That the U. S* District Court had the 
right to issue a restraining order to pre­
serve existing conditions while it consid­
ered its own authority. The vote on this 
question was 7 to 2 , with Justices Murphy 
and Rutledge dissenting. 
3» That miners working in government-
seized mines are U. S. employes. This de­
cision by a 6 to 2 vote, with Justices 
Murphy and Frankfurter dissenting. Justice 
Rutledge expressed no opinion on this 
question. 
4 . The court OoK^'d the merging of civil 
and criminal contempt in a single proceed­
ing. The vote was 7 to 2 , with Justices 
Murphy and Rutledge dissenting. 
5* The fine of $10,000 against Lewis was 
affirmed. The fine of $3,500,000 against 
the UMWA was reduced to $700,000 for crim­
inal contempt, conditional upon the UMWA 
withdrawing is contract termination notice, 
and thereby purging itself of contempt, 
within five days after issuance by the 
Supreme Court of a mandate, otherwise the 
$3,500,000 stands* 23 
The Court divided on all issues. Only Chief 
Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton agreed 
on all points. Justices Murphy and Rutledge dis­
sented all the way. The dissenters agreed that the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act bars any injunction, even by 
the government, and, as a consequence, Lewis did 
not have to obey the restraining order, and that, 
therefore, no fines whatsoever should be imposed. 
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Comment upon the decision was generally favor­
able* The House of Representatives broke into 
cheers on hearing the decision.^ Time called it 
an "appropriate decision,, " 2 5 The coal operators 
were very pleased.2^
 T h e surviving co-author of 
the act in question, Fiorello LaGuardia, said that 
the decision was correct in its interpretation of 
Congress1 intent when the bill was passed in 1 9 3 2 . ^ 
All of this mattered little to the union press that 
28 
reacted as if all unions now would be destroyed. 
Lewis8 defeat was completed, when on March 19 
he sent the following statement to Krug and the 
miners: "The notice of November 1 5 , 1946, termin­
ating the Krug-Lewis agreement as of November 20, 
1946, is hereby unconditionally withdrawn." 2 9 This 
invalidated his statement of December 7* 1946, that 
ended the contract on March 3 1 , 1947° Lewis had 
now purged the UMWA of criminal contempt thus 
paving the way for a reduction of the December 4 
fine to $700,000. The UMWA petitioned Judge Golds­
borough on March 25 for the $2,800,000 refund.3° 
The government returned the securities on April 24, 
when the government attorneys said they had no 
objections. 
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reacted as if all unions now would be destroyed. 
Lewis· defeat was completed, when on March 19 
he sent the following statement to Krug and the 
miners: liThe notice of November 15, 1946, termin-
ating the Krug-Lewis agreement as of November 20, 
1946, is hereby unconditionally withdrawn." 29 This 
invalidated his statement of December 7, 1946, that 
ended the contract on March 31, 19470 Lewis had 
now purged the UMWA of criminal contempt thus 
paving the way for a reduction of the December 4 
fine to $700,000" The UMWA petitioned Judge Golds-
borough on March 25 for the $29 800,000 refund.,30 
The government returned the securities on April 24, 
when the government attorneys said they had no 
objections. 
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CHAPTER IV: RELEASING OF THE MINES 
AND THE 194.3- CONTRACT 
President Truman announced on December 31* 1 9 4 6 , 
that World War II hostilities had ended. This state­
ment affected the coal industry in two direct ways: 
first, the seizure power of the government under the 
Smith-Connally Act expired on June 3°^ 1947> a n d 
second^ with the government stepping out, the oper­
ators and the UMWA were forced to negotiate a con­
tract for the industry.* But the operators8 nego­
tiating committee was badly split. The Northern and 
captive operators had, at an operators1 meeting on 
December 19? responded favorable to Lewis* earlier 
request for immediate negotiations. The Southern 
and Western operators refused to consider any meet­
ings with the UMWA until the Supreme Court decided 
the Lewis contempt case and until Congress acted on 
labor legislation 2 
By January 1 9 1 9 4 7 * the Western operators had 
joined the Northern and captive operators in asking 
the UMWA for contract negotiations covering their 
mines. This group represented about 6 5 percent of 
America's coal production,,3 The union, limited to a 
national agreement by its 1 9 4 6 convention, said that 
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the operators were "all committed under previous 
agreements to negotiate a wage agreement on a nation­
al basis a " 4 The situation remained deadlocked while 
Congress talked and the Supreme Court deliberated. 
With the strike set for April 1(under Lewis8 
December 7 statement), Representative Gerald Landis 
(Ro-Ind0) called upon Truman in February to get the 
disputants together* Senator Homer Capehart(R.-Ind.) 
on February 28 asked for Senate hearings on why there 
had been no negotiations. Lewis responded that he 
had been willing to talk since December 7> but had 
received no word from either the operators or the 
government on negotiations,5 Coal Mines Adminis­
trator Collisson in reply to Congressional inquiries, 
said that although ther were no valid reasons why 
negotiations were not being held, he could find no 
immediate prospect for an UMWA-operators agreement 
that would insure a return of the mines. 
The Supreme Court decision on March 6 assured 
that there would be no strike on April 1» The next 
day, March 7? Lewis told the Senate Labor Committee 
in hearings on the Taft bill that the government had 
stepped in to stop collective bargaining to protect 
the operatorso The mine owners, he said, were very 
satisfied with seizure since the coal operators had 
received record profits in 1 9 4 6 ^ 
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The statement by Lewis on March 1 9 , purging the 
UMWA of contempt, removed one of the major obstacles 
to negotiations. With the Lewis case decided and 
the proposed labor control bill still in committee, 
the Southern operators let it be known that they 
were now willing to negotiate a contract. The presi­
dent of a large Southern coal company stated that 
the Southerners were anxious to sign a contract with 
the UMWA that would end government control, but were 
not willing to sign a contract written by someone 
else.7 They insisted on a separate contract because 
of non-competitive transportation costs. 
All attempts at negotiation evaporated with 
the explosion at Centralia, Illinois, on March 25. 
This coal dust explosion in the Centralia Coal Com-
Q 
pany mine number five killed 111 men„° The tragedy 
gave Lewis an excellent bargaining point. He 
attacked the government, who operated the mine, and 
especially Krug, for not living up to the Federal 
safety code of 19460 Lewis8 outbursts were for 
public consumption in an attempt to get the public's 
support for union demands for safety provisions in 
its upcoming contract with the mine owners. The 
incident was used against the operators in a similar 
way.9 The disaster also gave Lewis the opportunity 
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pany mine number five killed III men"S The tragedy 
gave Lewis an excellent bargaining point.. He 
attacked the government~ who operated the mine, and 
especially Krug, for not living up to the Federal 
safety code of 1946 0 Lewis r outbursts were for 
public consumption in an attempt to get the public's 
support for union demands for safety provisions in 
its upcoming contract with the mine owners" The 
incident was used against the operators in a similar 
way., 9 The disaster also gave Lewis the opportunity 
to call a week long "memorial11 strike beginning on 
1 o 
April I.1 The memorial mourning period was violent­
ly denounced by the Coal Mines Administration and the 
operators as a violation of the Supreme Court mandate 
against an April 1 strike.1 1 The Justice Department 
decided otherwise allowing the return of the UMWA 
fine on April 24. 
Krug, attempting to save face for the govern­
ment, ordered, on April 4? the closing of 518 mines. 
These mines, producing 6l6,GOO tons daily, had been 
12 
declared unsafe by Federal mine inspectors. They 
were to remain closed until they could be rendered 
safe. Lewis, seeing Krug retreat, reopened his 
vitriolic attacks on him saying that "this is Krug's 
deathbed confession" of negligence. Krug under 
pressure retreated further asking Lewis to name 
other unsafe mines. Lewis, using government inspec­
tors1 reports, replied that only two of the 2531 
government operated mines were safe.^ Both Lewis 
and Krug knew it was impossible to close all the 
mines until they were safe. Lewis, sensing the pos­
sible reaction to such a closing, ordered the miners, 
on April 8, to return to work in those mines that 
the miners thermselves considered safe. Work re­
sumed in most mines not officially called "hazardous" 
and by April 13 output reached 60 percent of normal.^ 
ll e  u e orialu k i i  
Apri 1 10 10 The memorial mourning period. was violent-
ly denounced by the Coal Mines Administration and the 
operators as a violation of the Supreme Court mandate 
against an April I strikee 11 The Justice Department 
decided otherwise allowing the return of the UMWA 
fine on April 240 
Krug, attempting to save face for the govern-
ment, ordered, on April 4, the closing of 518 mines. 
These mines, producing 616,000 tons daily, had been 
declared unsafe by Federal mine inspectors,,12 They 
were to remain closed until they could be rendered 
safe. Lewis~ seeing Krug retreat, reopened his 
vitriolic attacks on him saying that Uthis is Krug's 
deathbed confession" of negligence~ Krug under 
pressure retreated further asking Lewis to name 
other unsafe mineso LewiS, using government inspec-
tors' reports~ replied that only two of the 2531 
government operated mines were safeo 13 Both Lewis 
and Krug knew it was imppssible to close all the 
mines until they were safeo Lewis, sensing the pos-
sible reaction to such a closing, ordered the miners, 
on April 8, to return to work in those mines that 
the miners thermselves considered safe o Work re-
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sumed in most mines not officially called i1hazardous" 
and by April 13 output reached 60 perc~nt ~f .normal~14 
Coming in the midst of the Centralia controversy 
the Medical Survey of the Bituminous-coal Industry 
added more public support to the UMWA positions on 
safety and welfare,, This document was a wholesale 
condemnation of the coal operators8 conduct toward 
the welfare of the.miners and their families. The 
survey included, medical services, medical facilities, 
housing, sanitation^ and recreational opportunies. 
Although condemning both the UMWA and. management, 
the survey in most ways aided the union's demands 
for increased concern for the miners1 welfare.*5 
The incident at Centralia had again postponed 
negotiations over a month. On April 1 6 Collisson 
sent invitations to the union and 31 operators1 
groups to meet with him on April 2 9 . The Northern 
and Western operators responded favorably, but the 
Southerners refused while Lewis said nothing. The 
UMWA finally consented and the first meeting since 
September between the mine workers and the mine 
owners began0 The operators remained divided with 
the Southern group reiterating its demand for separ­
ate talks because of higher freight rates. None 
of the operators seemed inclined to negotiate until 
after the American Mining Congress meeting that was 
to be held the second week of May. The union had 
no specific demands at the first meeting since these 
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these must be decided by the Policy Committee that 
was to meet on April 30, Lewis, for the firstttime, 
did not rule out separate talks with the Southern 
group of operators. The governments position was 
the bright spot of the meeting,, Collisson told the 
disputants that the Coal Mines Administration would 
not ask Congress for an extension of seizure power 
after June 3° and that the government would with­
draw from the meeting as soon as a bargaining re­
lationship had been established. The next meeting 
was set for May 1 5 . * ^ 
Before negotiations resumed, Lewis had a study 
made to determine the percentage of coal production 
mined in the South, excluding those Southern mines 
owned and operated by Northern owners as captive 
mines. This survey found only 27 percent of pro­
duction was under the control of Souther owners. 
These Southern operators charged Lewis with trying 
to undermine their bargaining position by forcing 
the captive mines in the South to negotiate as 
Northern mines, Lewis, with the information on 
Southern production, now accepted divided talks,*7 
The meeting on May 15 with the entire indusrty 
accomplished little until Lewis agreed to separate 
talks with the Southerners, Serious negotiations 
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began with the Northern, Western, and captive owners 
on May 1 6 . These secret meetings, lasting until 
May 3 l f were led by Lewis and OfNeill. T^e wage 
conference ended over the question of the probable 
passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 
1947(Taft-Hartley Act). The operators were insist-
ant that they must wait until the final decision on 
the bill was made,, The negotiations also stalled 
over basic daily pay rates, length of lunch period, 
changes in the safety code, unionization of foremen, 
and royalties and control of the Welfare Fund. The 
operators wanted to pay $ 1 1 . 3 5 per eight hour day 
with a 15 minute lunch break, no supervisors union, 
relaxing the safety code, no increase in Welfare 
Fund royalties, and at least equal representation 
on the control board of the Welfare Fund. The UMWA 
countered by asking for two-thirds of the Welfare 
Fund trustees, an eight hour day with 3° minutes 
for lunch for which they would receive $11 .85 , 
acceptance of the Federal mine safety code, and an 
increase in Welfare Fund royalty payments from 
five to ten cents per ton.*^ No new neetings were 
set after May 31° 
Negotiations with the Southern operators began 
on May 28. These meetings lasted until June 3« 
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This meeting was led by Henry F. Warden, for the 
operators, and John O'Leary, vice-president of the 
UMWA, for the miners. The negotiations quickly 
stalled over the operators' insistence that many 
provisions of the Krug-Lewis agreement were unac­
ceptable. The main disagreements were,those con­
cerning the management and scope of the Welfare 
Fund and the Federal safety code; the Southerners 
also wanted elimination of paid travel time inside 
the mines, mine safety committee power to close 
mines, and. pro-rata vacation pay. The union want­
ed to keep all it had gained in the Krug-Lewis 
agreement, strengthening of the weak parts of the 
Krug-Lewis agreement(this included stronger mine 
safety provisions, exclusive control of the Welfare 
Fund, and an increased royalty to be paid into 
the Fund), and increased wages. Both negotiation 
conferences ended when the UMWA charged the oper­
ators with violation of an unwritten agreement on 
publicity statements concerning the negotiations.19 
The negotiations broke down, or rather suspend 
ed, because neither side wanted to act until a 
final decision was reached concerning the now prob­
able Taft-Hartley Act. This bill was reported out 
of conference on June 3° It passed the House on 
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June 4 by a vote of 320 to 79 , The Senate passed 
the bill on June 6, 57 to 1 7 , The bill^had passed 
both houses by more than the necessary two-thirds 
needed to override a possible veto* The Act was 
sent to the President on June 9 , 2 0 President Truman 
returned the bill on June 20 to Congress with a 
strong veto message,2* The House overrode the veto 
within an hour of receiving the veto message by a 
vote of 331 to 83. The Senate by a vote of 68 to 
22 
25 made the bill a law on June 23, 
With the probalility of a strike on July 8, 
after the ten day miners1 vacation starting June 28, 
becoming more likely, both sides became more active 
in seeking a settlement. Upon the insistence of 
U, S, Steel and the Pittsburg Consolidation Coal 
Company, the two largest coal producers, new 
negotiations were started on June 15» The possibil­
ity of an earlier strike became real upon enactment 
of the Taft-Hartley Act when within three days of 
passage 250,000 miners stopped work to protest the 
Act's passage,23 in secret sessions the UMWA 
received most of its demands in a contract signed 
on July 8, The first operators to sign were the 
captive and Northern mine owners. The Southern 
operators, faced with accepting this contract or 
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With the probalility of a strike on July 8, 
after the ten day miners' vacation starting June 28, 
becoming more likely, both sides became more active 
in seeking a settlement e Upon the insistence of 
U. S. Steel and the Pittsburg Consolidation Coal 
Company, the two largest coal producers, new 
negotiations were started on June 15. The possibil-
ity of an earlier strike became real upon enactment 
of the Taft-Hartley Act when within three days of 
passage 250,000 miners stopped work to protest the 
Act's passage0 23 In secret sessions the UMWA 
received most of its demands in a contract signed 
on July 80 The first operators to sign were the 
captive and. Northern mine owners o The Southern 
operators, faced. with accepting this contract or 
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none, signed on July 9. By July 11 over 99 percent 
of American coal production was under the contract.24 
To avoid penalties under the Taft-Hartley Act 
the UMWA insisted and got inclusion of ways of 
protecting itself. The first was the elimination 
of the no-strike and penalty provisions of previous 
contracts. The second, and most famous, was the 
provision that the miners would work only when 
"able and willing." This eliminated the possibil­
ity of unauthorized, thus illegal, wild-cat strikes. 
The contract also gave the miners a wage of $13*40 
per eight hour day, a stronger safety code, and an 
increase in Welfare Fund royalties to ten cents per 
ton. In compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act, 
foremen were excluded from unionization and the 
UMWA and the operators maintained equal repre­
sentation on the board of trustees of the Welfare 
Fund. 2 5 
After fifteen months the private mine owners 
were now running their own properties. The price 
they #aid was steep. Except for those practices 
restricted by the Taft-Hartley Act, the contract, 
reopening the mines in July 1947* was the one de­
manded by the UMWA in March 1946. 
, g  l  0  r  t
eric  l cti  a er t .2
i  nalti  er aft artl  ct
A   (got  a
t t  tself. a im o
-st  alt  i  
t " ,  ost a s  a
i  t i er oul  or  l  
l  il  II hi i t  ssi il-
aut ori , le l il - at ik
tr ct i er a .
r t r , ro r  ,  
 elfar  .  t
to e  pli  it   aft artl  ct, 
rem  er  l  ro  i i t  .  
  t  erat r  aintai  al -
t ti   t  r  f tr t  f t  elf r  
 0 2
ft r ftee ont t  i ner
er i  i  r erti o 
 p i  a eepo cept t
  ~ ct, t t
i  i  , a -
ande   A ar  194
55 
NOTES ON CHAPTER IV 
*New York Times* January 1, 1947, P. 1; see 
Trumanus proclamation in Public Papers, II, 1946, 
P. 514* 
2Coal Age, LII(January 1947) , P» 101 . 
% e w York Times, January 2, 1947, P- 7-
%-ULJ, January 24, 1947, P. 4-
5 lb id., February 21 , 1947, P* 1; New York Times, 
March 1, 1947, p. 2; Time, XLIX(March 10, 1947) , 
P. 23. 
^New York Times, March 8, 1947, P- 3; Newsweek, 
XXIX(February 10, 1947) , P. 64. 
7New York Times, March 22, 1947, P« 2; Coal Age, 
LII(April 1947) , Po 129. 
^Theodore H. White, 11'Number Five Was a Dry 
Mine,"1 The New Republic, CXVKMay 5, 1947) , PP. 2 1 -
23; Coal Age, LII(May 1947), pp. 132, 134, and 136. 
9uMWJ, LVIII(April 1, 1947) , PP. 3 -5 . 
l°This was legal since paragraph 6 of the 
"Safety Practices" section of the 1941 agreement 
states: "The International-Union, United Mine Workers 
of America, may designate Memorial periods provided 
it shall give proper notice to each District." This 
provision had been carried forward in subsequent 
agreements, see National Coal Wage Conference, Op. 
cit., p. 65 . 
11Newsweek, XXIX(April 7, 1947) , P- 27; Time, 
XLIX(April 14 , 1947) , PP« 22-23. 
l2The Colliery Guardian, CLXXIV(April 1 1 , 1947) , 
p» 463. This was• '26Pperben't".. of,the nation's output 
of coal,, 
 
1 or i es,  p$ 
a '  at  bli er  , 19
p. 51 0 
2coal e~ I a   p& 010 
3Ne  or  i es     p. . 
4W-UL ~   p  . 
I q r r   p. w or  'r es  
ar    o  I ( ar  1
I) . --
6 or  i es  ar    p.  s ee , 
IX(Februar ,  p  
or  i es, ar   , p. oal ge, 
I pril  p  1 0
8 r   hit , IIINumber Five Was a Dry 
i  III   epubli , · I ( ay   pp  
 oal  I (M  ),     .  
U I( pril  pp$ 3-5e 
10 hi  a  l  t
f t  r icesl! t  e e t
li  el' ion l'_ nion, ni t  i orker
f merica, a  Si at  emorial r   
all er t   istri t  It i
i   r  ar  t
ents,  ati al oal wa onfer ce, ~
i  .. ,  .. 
e s ek, XIX(April  , p.  i e,
LI (April , , o 
12 h  Oo li  uardi , O XXIV(April , 1
. •. i s- Was' 26" ,er'cen't'  oT' , he" ha.,tlon t s on::t  
f COg.) e 
57 
*3Time» XLIX(April 14 , 1947) , P» 22. The two 
"safe" mines were the Reliance #2 and Stanls&irryi::M*ies 
operated by the Union Pacific Coal Company in 
Wyoming. 
^ T h e Colliery Guardian, CLXXIV(April 18 , 1947) , 
p. 490; New York Times, April 14 , 1947, P. 1 3 . A 
Federal investigation found the Centralia Coal Co* 
"willfully negligent'1 in providing necessary safety 
measures. The company was later fined $1000(maximum 
under Illinois state law) for this offense. See 
UMWJ, LVIIl(July 1 5 , 1947) , P* 10 . 
*5see Department of the Interior, A Medical 
Survey of the Bituminous-coal Industry, 1947. For 
operators" attempted rebuttal of this report see 
Newsweek, XXIX(February 10, 1947) , P* 5 1 ; and Coal 
Age, LII(June 1947) , PP. 7 4 - 7 7 . 
l 6 Ibid., LII(May 1947)* P. 177; New York Times, 
April 1 7 , 1947, P. 1; April 28, 1947, PP. 1 and 14; 
and April 30, 1947, P. 1. 
1 7 T h e Colliery Guardian, CLXXIV(May 23, 1947) , 
p. 662; New York Times, May 1, 1947, P. 22; May 7, 
1947, p. IS; and May 16 , 1947, P. 1 2 . 
l 8 UMWJ, LVIIl(June 1 5 , 1947) , P. 3-
1 9 I bid. t pp. 3-4. 
2
°
L e e > OP. cit., pp. 7 7 - 7 8 . 
2 1 Public Papers, III, 1947, PP. 288-297? 
Har ry S. Truman,' Memo irstNew York; ^ Botib 1 ed^ cy & JOcrm-
pany, 1956) , pp. 45-46. 
2 2 L e e, OP. cit», pp. 100-102. 
2 3coal_Age, LII(July 1947) , P. 125; The Col­
liery Guardian, CLXXIV(June 27, 1947) , p. ^32. 
24UMWJ, LVIII(July 1 5 , 1947) , PP. 3 -5 . 
2 5 s e e contract in ibid
 Q , pp. 1 1 - 1 4 ; also see 
Truman's statement on the settlement in Public Papers, 
III, 1947, Po 332. 
1 i e, LIX(April  p& ~  t
n i er h  el  anBC~yr:mlle
er t  h  ni  acifi  oal pa  
yo i  .. 
14The o li  uardi , XXIV(April  1
G ;  or  ~ pril , p.  
eral st t   h  entrali  oal C ~
 I  gli ent II i  s  
easures.  pa   n  ( m
er in aw)  e
J, II( l   p. 0 
1 S  epart ent ~ h  t  edical
r   i i ous-coal st ,  or
erat r l te t  tt l rt 
e s eek, IX(Februar   , p. al
ge, I   pp. . --
16Ibi ., I (M  ), p.  or  i es,
pril , p~  pril ~ , pp  
 pril , , p  
17The ol ie: ;  uardi , I ( a  947)'
. ;  or  i es, a   , p.  a  
7,  . 18  a  , 7, p  
18u WJ, II(  >, p. . 
19Ibi  .. ,  3-4&
20Lee , o ., p~ . 
21Publi  er , , pp .. ;
ar  r an, ~,M otretNew-.~YCJX:lc: JDou Jied~' ;Oom­
,  o -460 
22Lee , pe e  0 
23Coal Age, II l   p  5; e l-
e  uardi , XIV(Ju   Pit 8 .
J, I(J l  ,  pp. 
25s  tr ct n o, pp. 1-14; also s e 
r an'  ate t h  tlem t bli  er
, 7, p  2$
CHAPTER V:7POSTSCRIPT 
There were three enduring results of the conflicts 
of the UMWA stemming from the years 1946 and 1947 • The 
first is the role of the UMWA in the formation of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. The second is the most important con­
cession received by the UMWA in the dispute: the Welfare 
Fund. And last is the role of the UMWA in the labor 
unity movement. 
The Taft-Hartley Act is considered only in the 
areas where the UMWA had an influence on the formula­
tion of or was directly affected by the act.1 The Taft-
Hartley Act was enacted by the Eightieth Congress elect­
ed in 1946. This was the first Republican Congress 
since 193° and with an alliance with conservative 
Southern Democrats passed the first major labor law 
since 193&» John L» Lewis played an important role 
in this election* Lewis, a registered Republican who 
supported Willkie in 1940, was a conservative in all 
areas except those affecting labor,, Lewis received, 
what he considered, ill treatment from both Roosevelt 
(over the "little steel formula") and Truman(over the 
handling of the spring strike in 1946) . He, therefore, 
had few qualms in embarrassing Truman before the 194^ 
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elections. Truman saw through Lewis and accurately 
foretold the results of the election when he said, 
on December 1 1 , 1946, that Lewis had "attempted to 
pull a dirty political trick and it backfired; but 
he succeeded in giving labor generally a black eyes 
which will do labor no good in the new Republican 
Congress." Of course reaction to Lewis did not, 
of itself, elect the 1946 Republicans, but his threats 
and blusterings of October and November aided them 
immensely. But Truman acted as though Lewis was the 
primary reason for the election results. This is 
seen in the vindictive policy pursued by the Presi­
dent upon the UMWA a"fter the election results became 
known. 
Lewis1 timing was poor all through the delibera­
tions on the Taft-Hartley Act. All during the time 
that the Taft-Hartley Act was being considered he 
was threatening the country with a coal strike. First 
on April 1, 1947? and later on July 1. 
The House Committee on Education and Labor held 
hearings from February 5 to March 1 3 . These coinciced 
with the Supreme Court decision on the UMWA and Lewis. 
With this decision the House had little to fear by 
reintroducing the labor injunction into law. The 
Hartley bill passed the House on April 17 immediately 
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following the memorial stoppage. This was in the 
midst of the outcry by the operators that Lewis had 
violated the Supreme Court mandate. Lewis1 actions 
could only have aided the passage of the bill in 
the House. 
On the same day, April 17> Taft reported his 
bill from committee. Taft*s bill was passed on 
May 1 3 . The passage occurred as negotiations between 
the operators and the UMWA had recessed. The Senate 
bill included a provision that would have limited 
industrywide bargaining. The UMWA had tried to 
avoid this provision by dividing talks with the 
operators, but had failed to prevent Senate passage. 
A conference committee, meeting from May 15 to 
May 29, arrived at the compromise Taft-Hartley bill. 
By May 29 all hopes of a coal settlement had passed. 
As seen above, both parties were waiting to see what 
the Taft-Hartley Act included and the restrictions 
that would be placed on the UMWA. It seems that 
there were direct relationships between the failure of 
the coal industry and the UMWA to agree on a settle­
ment and the formation of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Actions by both these parties during the spring of 
1947 helped to push Congress into action against 
all unions. The inactivity of the coal negotiators 
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in May and June of 1947 aided an anti-labor coalition 
in Congress to pass the legislation before a coal 
strike on July 1 Q 3 
Certain restrictive sections of the Act were 
direct results of UMWA actions during 1946 and 1947• 
These were the exclusion of supervisors from em­
ployee status, the outlawing of union operated wel­
fare funds, the suability of unions in court, the 
revival in law of labor injunctions, and that Federal 
employees could not strike. The first two of these 
were major UMWA demands in negotiations in 194& and 
1947; the last three were the direct result of the 
Lewis case. The other provisions were not so spec­
ifically in response to the UMWA actions since the 
so-called "unfair labor practices" were common to 
most unions. Two items, the exclusion of Communists 
and the elimination of the closed shop, did not 
affect the UMWA. The UMWA had excluded all Commun­
ists in J927 and it was a union shop organization.4 
"I can't understand . . . why anyone would 
oppose a Health and Welfare Fund which is doing 
such magnificent work."5 This comment by Truman 
in 1948 has become generally accepted by most Amer­
icans. Though referred to as the Welfare Fund, it 
was set up in 1946 as two separate funds: a Welfare 
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and Retirement Fund(jointly administered by the UMWA 
and the government) and a Medical and Hospital Fund 
(operated by the UMWA), These began operation in 
early 1947 and the first benefits were for the sur­
vivors and dependents 6f the Centralia explosion. 
The Taft-Hartley Act made union operated funds illegal 
and in the 1947 contract the two funds were merged 
into one Welfare and Retirement Fund. The Fund 
covered all miners, their dependents, and ex-miners. 
It provided a comprehensive insurance, including 
hospital and doctor coverage, death benefits, re­
habilitation, and retirement. 
A major reoganizatian took place in 1950 follow­
ing a year that saw a suspension of payments because 
of insufficent income. The Fund established in the 
195° contract has continued to the present. Beginning 
in 1953> the Fund began a chain of ten hospitals to 
provide medical care in Appalachia.^ These hospitals 
were all operating by 1955 providing medical care and 
nurses' training for this depressed area. Extreme 
financial problems forced the Fund to sell the hos­
pitals in 1963-19640 
The Fund is run by a board of three trustees. 
One is appointed by the UMWA, one by the operators, 
and one by the other two. Lewis has been the union 
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trustee since the Fund's inception. The operators 
have been represented by Captain N. H. Collisson 
(1946-1947» under government seizure), Ezra Van Horn 
(1947-1950) , Charles Owens(1950-1956), and Henry 
Schmidt(1956-present). The neutral trustee has been 
Thomas E. Murray(1947-1948), Styes Bridges(1948-1950), 
and Josephine Roche(1950-present). Except for the 
year 1949 the trustees have done an excellent job 
of administering the Fund. Contrasted with commer­
cial group insurance and commercial insurance, which 
return only 90 and 52 percent respectively of their 
incomes in benefits, the UMWA Welfare Fund returns 
97 percent of its collections of over $120 million 
per year,? 
Although royalties have been increased 1200 
percent since the Fund's establishment, the Fund has 
been and. continues to be plagued by a lack of money. 
This has been caused by a variety of reasons all 
stemming from the decline of coal markets. Employ­
ment in coal mining has dropped from over 400,000 
in 1946 to less than 200,000 at the present. The 
source of the Fund's income, an increasing royalty 
on the amount of coal produced, has helped maintain 
revenues, but with the drop in employment fewer 
young men turn to mining and more of the remaining 
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miners are in the upper age brackets and are thus 
retiring or near retirement. This forces more and 
more of the Fund's monies into the pension area. A 
major cause of this employment drop is mechanization 
of the mines which has advanced at a rapid rate. 
The Fund has remained solvent by reducing its ben­
efits in all areas, The situation will stabilize in 
the future, but not until many of the older retired 
miners have died. 
"Unity of labor's policies in America is desir­
able. Attainment of that unity is labor's task and 
o 
obligation." Although Lewis expressed this idea 
many times his actions have questioned his sincerity. 
He has always been happy to help his laboring 
friends as seen in his generous loans to other 
unions: $500,000 to the telephone workers in 1947 
and $10 million to the steel workers in 1950. He 
participated, as the UMWA representative, and as the 
AFL representative during 1946 and 1947? in many 
unity conferences with the CIO and the independent 
railroad brotherhoods. In 1947* when he was repre­
senting the AFL, Lewis asked the CIO unions to join 
the AFL in the same way that the UMWA had: as inde­
pendent unions. But in December 1947? when the AFL 
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obligations tl8 Although Lewis expressed this idea 
many times his actions have questioned his sincerity. 
He has always been happy to help his laboring 
friends as seen in his generous loans to other 
unions: $500,000 to the telephone workers in 1947 
and $10 million to the steel workers in 1950. He 
participated, as the UMWA representative, and as the 
AFL representative during 1946 and 1947, in mal1Y 
unity conferences with the CIO and the independent 
railroad brotherhoods o In 1947, when he was repre-
senting the AFL~ Lewis asked the CIO unions to join 
the AFL in the same way that the UMWA had: as inde-
pendent unions o But in December 1947, when the AFL 
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refused to back his actions against the Taft-Hartley 
requirement to sign anti-Communist oaths, he took 
the UMWA out of the AFL. 9 
After Lewis left the AFL he was invited to 
unity conferences in 1949 and 1950. He did not 
participate in either conference the the CIO blamed 
his refusal to join the 1950 conference for the fail­
ure of the conference. During the Korean War, Lewis 
refused to join the other unions in a united war 
effort. While the AFL and the CIO were moving closer 
together, in the early 1950*s> Lewis was moving far­
ther from both groups. George Meany in 1952 charged 
Lewis with creating the CIO to establish his own 
power base in organized labor. Meany later charged 
that Lewis would not be included in the unity talks 
because, "Good Lord! He's the fellow that spilt the 
AFL. He*s the fellow who tried to split the CIO 
after he got tired of that. He's the fellow who 
came back to the AFL in 1947 and tried to split it 
again." 1 0 Meany reflected the view of both, the CIO 
and the AFL: they were willing to listen to Lewis 
urge unity, but were wary of having him in any united 
labor movement. 
Another aspect of Lewis8 lack of intent in 
labor unity was his creation of the omnibus District 5°« 
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This department, the largest of the UMWA thirty-
one districts, contains workers in all segments of 
industry from railroad workers on Long Island to 
bartenders in Wyoming. The jurisdictional problems 
created by this district have hampered the UMWA in 
all unity moves. Lewis doesn't want to lose these 
workers and other unions claim they shoud belong to 
their organizations whether industrial or craft.^ 
Considering all these factors, including the per­
sonality of John L. Lewis, it is not surprising 
that the UMWA has remained an independent union 
since 1947 . 
i r ent, st  
i t t i orker l ents f
st  ro  ro  orker a  
r r  yo i o l oblems.
 i t t per  A 
l i  ove o i esn't ant h
orker  t r i i    
i i t  het er stri l t. 11 
onsi eri  l   -
ali   . is, t n
t A ai   ent 
19
66 
NOTES ON CHAPTER V 
*For the latest account of the Taft-Hartley Act 
see Lee, Op. cit. 
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^Lauck, Op. cit., p. 244; Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Bulletin No. 865, Extent of Collective 
Bargaining and Union Recognition, 1945, 1946, p. 6. 
^Harry S. Truman, The Truman Program: Addresses 
and Messages by President Harry S. Truman, ed M. B. 
Schnapper (Wa s hi ng t o n: Public Affairs Press, 1948), 
p. 140. 
^The hospitals were built in Beckley, Man, and 
Williamson, West Virginia; Middlesboro, Pikeville, 
Harlan, Hazard, Whitesburg, and McDowell, Kentucky; 
and Wise, Virginia. 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has tried to show some of the 
difficulties of a government-operated industry in 
the American economic system. It was written 
focusing upon the labor side of the conflict. 
Since governmental workers in seized industries in 
this country are organized, special problems de­
velop in the policies of these unions in their 
relationship to their employer: the United States 
government. The problem dealt with in this essay 
was an extraordinary one since the union involved 
attempted to use tactics that, though they had 
proven useful in dealing with the operators, could 
not be used by government employees. 
The idea is developed in this essay of the 
futility of government direction of labor-manage­
ment contracts. In the case of the coal miners, 
shown here, government intervention and seizure did 
not help in drawing the miners and the operators 
into anything close to agreement. Under seizure 
the private operators were relieved of their ob­
ligations, but received the profits. The operators 
used the government to fight its continuing battles 
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with the UMWA. The government, in its desire to 
get the mines working, signed a very generous 
contract. By doing so it alienated many operators 
who felt they could not, for competitive economic 
reasons, grant so much to the UMWA. In signing 
this contract the government put enormous pressure 
on the operators to give, inr\apyrsubsequent oontrac$, 
even better, and more costly, concessions to the 
miners. This is exactly what happened when the 
mines were released in 1 9 4 7 . The UMWA, for its 
part, resented any interference by the government 
in, what it considered, its legal conflict with 
the operators. Though the miners were pleased with 
the economic and welfare provisions of their contract 
with the government, they did not like the restric­
tions placed upon their actions by being government 
employees. Resentments were thus built on both 
sides: the operators did not like the government 
giving the miners so much of their profits, while 
the miners did not like working for the government 
while their bosses received record profits. 
The incidents involved in this essay had a 
very strong effect on national labor policy. As 
seen above, the actions of unions, and especially 
the UMWA, during reconversion, though many were 
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legal and justifiable, alienated the majority of the 
public. The results are found in the Taft-Hartley 
Act. The revival of the labor injunction against the 
UMWA assured the inclusion of an injunction provision 
in this legislation. The fear of a nationwide coal 
strike throughout 1946 and 1947 played into the hands 
of those who felt restrictions on labor were necessary 
Many of the restrictions in the Taft-Hartley Act were 
the result of this fear, that neared the panic stage 
in several cases including the one discussed in this 
essay. Although the resulting limitations on labor 
were violently denounced by labor for many years, 
most of the Taft-Hartley Act has been accepted by 
organized labor as necessary. 
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Increases in price for select items, 1945-1947• Based 
on 1935-1939 averages equal 100o Percent increases June 
1946-December 1947: food 39$, all items 24$, clothing 
21$, and rent 6%„ Taken from Truman, The Economic 
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Net saving as percent of disposable personal income 
From Trumanf The Economic Reports of the President, 
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TABLE I 
Work Stoppages Man Days idle 
number Workers 
involved 




First post war 
year (August 
1 5 , 1945-Aug-
ust 14 , 1946): 
Total 4,630 4,981, 000 119,785,000 1.62 
World War II: 

























. 1 5 
.09 
. 1 7 
Yearly average 
1935-1939 2,862 1,125,000 16,949,000 .27 
Work stoppages in the first year after VJ-day, in 
World War II, and in the 1935-1939 period. From 
Monthly Labor Review, LXIII(December 1946), p. 883. 
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TABLE II 
Month Stoppages beginning Man Days idle (all 
in month stoppages) 
Number Wo rke r s Number Percent of 




January 325 1,400,000 19,750,000 3-1 
February 275 130,000 23,000,000 4 . 2 
March 420 165,000 13,825,000 2.3 
April 495 575 ? ooo 15,550,000 2.4 
May 380 560,000 12,360,000 1.9 
June 375 175.000 4,475,000 .7 
July 525 190,000 3,300,000 .5 
August 515 240,000 3,425*000 0 *2 
September 450 380,000 5,000,000 & *J 
October 450 290,000 4,500,000 0 6 
November 310 450,000 4,750,000 .7 
December 180 95,000 3,065,000 .4 
Monthly trend in work stoppages, 1946. From 
Monthly Labor Review, LXIV(February 1947) , P» 264. 
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DOCUMENT I 
^The Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1 9 4 6 known 
as the Krug-Lewis agreement/ 
This agreement between the Secretary of the Inter­
ior, acting as Coal Mines Administrator under the author­
ity of Executive Order No. 9 7 2 8 ( d a t e d May 2 1 , 1 9 4 6 . 1 1 
F. R. 5 5 9 3 ) * a ^ d the United Mine Workers of America, 
covers for the period of Government possession the terms 
and conditions of employment in respect to all mines in 
Government possession which were as of March 3 1 > 1 9 4 6 ? 
subject to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement 
dated April 1 1 , 1 9 4 5 ° 
1 , PROVISIONS OF NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL WAGE 
AGREEMENT PRESERVED 
Except as amended and supplemented herein, this 
agreement carries forward and preserves the terms and 
conditions contained in all joint wage agreements effec­
tive April 1 , 1 9 4 1 ? through March 3 1 , 1 9 4 3 ? the supple­
mental agreement providing for the s i x ( 6 ) day work 
week, and all the various district agreements executed 
between the United Mine Workers and the various Coal 
Associations and Coal Companies(based upon the afore­
said basic agreement) as they existed on March 3 1 * 1 9 4 3 * 
and the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, dated 
April 1 1 , 1 9 4 5 o 
2 . MINE SAFETY PROGRAM 
(a) FEDERAL MINE SAFETY CODE 
As soon as practicable and not later than 3 ° days 
from the date of the making of the agreement, the Direct­
or 6f the Bureau of Mines after consultation with repre­
sentatives of the United Mine Workers and such other 
persons as he deems appropriate!, will issue a reasonable 
code of standards and rules pertaining to safety condi­
tions and practices in the mines. The Coal Mines Admin­
istrator will put this code into effect at the mines. 
Inspectors of the Federal Bureau of Mines shall make 
periodic investigations of the mines and report to the 
Coal Mines Administrator any violations of the Federal 
Safety Code. In cases of violation the Coal Mines Ad­
ministrator will take appropriate action which may in­
clude disciplining or replacing the operating manager 
so that will all reasonable dispatch said violation 
will be corrected. 
From time to time the Director of the Bureau of 
Mines may9 upon request of the Coal Mines Administrator 
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or the United Mine Workers^ review and revise the Federal 
Mine Safety Code* 
(b) MINE SAFETY COMMITTEE 
At each mine there shallbbeDa/Mtne.S^fetyGCommittee 
selected by the local union. The Mine Safety Committee 
may inspect any mine development or equipment used in 
producing coal for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
compliance with the Federal Safety Code exists. The 
Committee members while engaged in the performance of 
their duties shall be paid by the Union, but shall be 
deemed to be acting within the scope of their employment 
in the mine within the meaning of the Workmen's Compen­
sation Law of the state where such duties are performed. 
If the Committee believes conditions found endanger 
the life and bodies of the mine workers, it shall report 
its findings and recommendations to the management. In 
those special instances where the Committee believes an 
immediate danger exists and the Committee recommends 
that the management remove all mine workers from the 
unsafe area, the operating manager or his managerial 
subordinate is required to follow the recommendation of 
the Committee^ unless and until the Coal Mines Adminis­
trator, taking into account the inherently hazardous 
character of coal mining, determines that the authority 
of the Safety Committee is being misused and he cancels 
or modifies that authority. 
The Safety Committee and the operating manager 
shall maintain such records concerning inspections, 
findings, recommendations and actions relating to this 
provision of the agreement as the Coal Mines Adminis­
trator may require and shall supply such reports as he 
may request. 
3 o WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
The Coal Mines Administrator undertakes to direct 
each operating manager to provide its employes with the 
protection and coverage of the benefits under Workmen's 
Compensation and Occupational Disease Laws, whether 
compulsory or elective, existing in the states in which 
the respective employes are employed. Refusal of any 
operating manager to carry out this direction shall be 
deemed a violation of his duties as operating manager. 
In the event of such refusal the Coal Mines Administra­
tor will take appropriate action which may include dis­
ciplining or replacing the operating manager or shutting 
down the mine. 
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4. HEALTH AND WELFARE PROGRAM 
There is hereby provided a health and welfare pro­
gram in broad outline—and it is recognized that many 
important details remain to be filled in—such program 
to consist of three parts9 as follows: 
(a) A WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND 
A welfare and retirement fund is hereby created 
and there shall be paid into said fund by the operating 
managers five cents per ton on each ton of coal pro­
duced for use or for sale0 This fund shall be managed 
by three trustees9 one appointed by the Coal Mines Ad­
ministrator, one appointed by the President of the 
United Mine Workers^, and the third chosen by the other 
two. The fund shall be used for making payments to 
miners, and their dependents and survivors, with respect 
to (i) wage loss not otherwise compensated at all or 
adequately under the provisions of Federal or State 
law and resulting from sickness (temporary disability), 
permanent disability, death or retirement, and (ii) 
other related welfare purposes, as determined by the 
trustees. Subject to the stated purposes of the fund, 
the trustees shall have full authority with respect to 
questions of coverage and eligibility, priorities among 
classes of benefits9 amounts of benefits, methods of 
providing or arranging for provision of benefits, and 
all related matters* 
The Coal Mines Administrator will instruct the 
operating managers that the obligation to make pay­
ments to the welfare and retirement fund becomes effec­
tive with reference to coal produced on and after June 1, 
1946; the first actual payment is to be made on 
August 15? 1946, covering the period from June 1 to 
July 15 ; the second payment to be made on September 15» 
covering the period from July 15 to August 31 ; and 
thereafter payment to be made on the 15 th day of each 
month covering the preceding montho 
(b) A MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL FUND 
There shall be created a medical and hospital fund, 
to be administered by trustees appointed by the President 
of the United Mine Workers,, This fund shall be accumu­
lated from the wage deductions presently being made and 
such as may hereafter be authorized by the Union and. its 
members for medical, hospital^ and related services for 
the miners and their dependents0 The money in this fund 
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snail be used for the indicated purposes at the discre­
tion of the trustees of the fund; and the trustees shall 
provide for such regional or local variations and adjust­
ments in wage deductions,* benGfits^andcbfcher^practices, 
and transfer of funds to local unions, as may be necessary 
and as are in accordance with agreements made within the 
framework of the Union8s organization. 
The Coal Mines Administrator agrees(after the 
trustees make arrangements satisfactory to the Coal Mines 
Administrator) to direct each operating manager to turn 
over to this fund, or to such local unions as the trustees 
of the fund may directs all such wage deductions, begin­
ning with a stated date to be agreed upon by the Admin­
istrator and the President of the United Mine Workers: 
Provided, however9 that the United Mine Workers shall 
first obtain the consent of the affected employes to 
such turn-over. The Coal Mines Administrator will co­
operate fully with the United Mine Workers to the end 
that there may be terminated as rapidly as may be prac­
ticable any existing agreements that earmark the expen­
diture of such wage deductions, except as the continua­
tion of such agreements may be approved by the trustees 
of the fund. 
Present practices with respect to wage deductions 
and their use toi provisions of medical^ hospital and 
related services shall continue until such date or dates 
as may be agreed upon by the Coal Mines Administrator 
and the President of the United Mine Workers. 
(e) COORDINATION OF THE WELFARE AND RETIREMENT 
FUND AND THE MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL FUND 
The Coal Mines Administrator and the United Mine 
Workers agree to use their good offices to assure that 
trustees of the two funds described above will cooper­
ate in and coordinate the development of policies and 
working agreements necessary for the effective opera­
tion of each fund toward achieving the result that 
each fund will, to the maximum degree practicable, 
operate to complement the other. 
5 o SURVEY OF MEDICAL AND SANITARY FACILITIES 
The Coal Mines Administrator undertakes to have 
made a comprehensive survey and study of the hospital 
and medical facilities, medical treatment, sanitary, 
and housing conditions in the coal mining areas. The 
purpose of this survey will be to determine the char­
acter and scope of improvements which should be: made 
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to provide the mine workers of the Nation with medical, 
housing and sanitary facilities conforming to recognized 
American standards. 
6. WAGES 
(a) All mine workers, whether employed by the day, 
tonnage or footage rate, shall receive $1.85 per day 
in addition to that provided for in the contract which 
expired March 3 1 , 19460 
(b) Work performed on the sixth consecutive day 
is optional, hut when performed shall he paid for at 
time and one-half or rate and one-half. 
(c) Holiday, when worked, shall be paid for at 
time and one-half or rate and one-half. Holidays shall 
be computed in arriving at the sixth and seventh day 
in the week. 
7 o VACATION PAYMENT 
An annual vacation period shall be the rule of the 
industry. From Saturday, June 29, 1946, to Monday, 
July 8, 1946, inclusive^ shall be a vacation period 
during which coal production shall cease. Day-men re­
quired to work during this period at coke plants and 
other necessarily continuous operations or on emergency 
or repair work shall have vacations of the same duration 
at other agreed periods. 
All employes with a record of one year's standing 
(June 1, 1955 to May 3 1 , 1946) shall reveive as compen­
sation for the above mentioned vacation period the sum 
of one hundred dollars($100), with the following excep­
tion: Employes who entered the armed services and those 
who returned from the armed services to their jobs during 
the qualifying period shall receive the $100 vacation 
payment. 
All the terms and provisions of district agreements 
relating to vacation pay for sick and injured employes 
are carried forward to this agreement and payments are 
to be made in the sumo as provided herein. 
Pro rata payments for the months they are on the 
payroll shall be provided for those mine workers who are 
given employment during the qualifying period and those 
who leave their employment. 
The vacation payment of the 1946 period shall be 
madecan; the; last pay day.occur r xng iinthe mnhfchoof •"June 
of that year. 
8. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
Upon petition filed by the United Mine Workers with 
the Coal Mines Administrator showing that the procedure 
o. Qvi  i Qrkers Qf at Q  i  edical  
Qusi  i  il Qnf i  o. ecQ i  
eric  an " 
" 
I  l i  Qrkers, het er plQyed , 
Q  Qr QQt J ll  0 85 
i iQ  o. t Qvi  Q  Qntract hi
i  arc  ~
Qr fQ  Q   Qnsecuti  
QptiQnal, b t he fQ  ll b i  Q  t
im Qne-half Qr Qne- al " 
Qli a , he  Qrked, all i  Q  t
im e- alf Qr Qne- al o Qli s ll
Q puted   t  .a
e o 
0 TI  A
al Q  Q  ll Qf 
ry.. Q t ,  , o. Qnda , 
 , , 9 ll  t  iQ  
r  hi  Qal Q uct Q  ll o a e  r -
i  o. Qr r  Q  l t  
Qt er cessaril  Qnt Q s Qperat Q  Qr Q  er
Qr i Qrl{ ll at  iQ
t Qt er  iQ o 
ll pl es it   Qr  Qf  arl tan
 ~ o. a   ) ll  e -
iQ  Q  Q entiQne  Q  Q  h  
Qf  dr  lars($IOO  it  lQ i  -
iQ  plQyes  t    hQ
.  rQ e   i Q
ali  Q  ll h  0 iQ
ent 0 
ll er Qvi Q s Qf i t i t ee e t
 o. at     lQ
r  ar  o. ent ents 
o. a  u ,: Qvi  n" 
o. ents   Qn,ths Q  t
rQll ll Qvi  Q  hQ i Qrkers o. 
 plQy ent r  ali  Q  hQ
. i e Q e o 
iQ  ent   Q  ll
lo ~ .he~.la.st.p  ' ~  ~ Q :urttpg~ . -·.the~mnntho· L-JlIne 
Qf t o 
0 'r  r 
Q ti  le  nit  i Qrkers i
Qal ines dministrat r Q i  t Q r
80 
for the adjustment of grievances in any coal producing 
district is inequitable in relation to the generally 
prevailing standard of such procedures in the industry, 
the Coal Mines Administrator will direct the operating 
managers at mines in the district shown to have an in­
equitable grievance procedure to put into effect within 
a reasonable period of time the generally pervailing 
grievance procedure in the industry. 
9 o DISCHARGE CASES 
The Coal Mines Administrator will carry out the 
provision in agreements which were in effect on March 3 1 > 
1 9 4 6 , between coal mine operators and the United Mine 
Workers that cases involving the discharge of employes 
for cause shall be disposed of within five days. 
1 0 . FINES AND PENALTIES 
No fines or penalties shall be imposed unless author 
ized by the Coal Mines Administrator. In the event that 
such fines or penalties are imposed by the Coal Mines 
Administrator, the funds withheld for that reason shall 
be turned over to the trustees of the fund provided for 
in section 4 ( b ) hereof, to be used for the purposes 
stated therein. 
1 1 . SUPERVISORS 
With respect to questions affecting the employment 
and bargaining status of foremen, supervisors, technical 
and clerical workers employed in the bituminous mining 
industry, the Coal Mines Administrator will be guided 
by the decisions and procedure laid down by the National 
Labor Relations Board, 
1 2 . SAFETY 
Nothing herein shall operate to nullify existing 
state statutes^ but this agreement is intended to supple­
ment the aforesaid statutes in the interest of increased 
mine safety. 
1 3 o RETROACTIVE WAGE PROVISIONS 
The Wage provisions of this agreement shall be 
retroactive to May 2 2 , 1 9 4 6 ° 
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1 4 o EFFECTIVE DATE 
This agreement is effective as of May, 2 9 , 1 9 4 6 , sub­
ject to approval of appropriate Government agencies. 
Signed at Washington, D. C. on this 2 9 t h day of 
May, 1 9 4 6 . 
JULIUS A 0 KRUG, Coal Mines Admin-
i strator 
JOHN L. LEWIS, President United 
Mine Workers of America 
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DOCUMENT II 
^Select parts of Section 4 of the Norris-
laGuardia Act(47 StatQ 70^7 
Section 4° No court of the United States shall have 
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary 
or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing 
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons 
participating or interested in such dispute (as these 
terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or 
in concert, any of the following acts: 
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to 
remain_in any relation of employment; (Subsection (b) omitted/; c) Paying or giving to,,or withholding from, any 
person participating or interested in such labor dispute, 
any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or 
other moneys or things of value; 
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person partici­
pating or interested in any labor dispote who is being 
proceeded against in9 or is prosecuting,^any action or 
suit in any court of the United States or of any State; 
(e) Giving publicity to the, existence of, or the 
facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by adver­
tising, speaking, patrolling or by any other method not 
involving fraud or violence; 
tf) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to 
act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute; 
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an inten­
tion to do any of the acts heretofore specified; 
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do 
any of the acts heretofore specified; and 
(i) Advising, urging or otherwise causing or induc­
ing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore speci­
fied* 
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